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Beyond the Urban-Suburban Dichotomy: A
Discussion of Sub-Regional Poverty
Concentration
GEORGETTE C. POINDEXTERt
I. INTRODUCTION

Many theories of regionalism assert that for reasons of
global economic competitiveness and social justice, political
boundaries within the region must be dissolved.' While the
level of dissolution may vary (from a complete melding into
one political machine to a multi-layered federation to
cooperation between political jurisdictions), the common
thread entails the economic (if not social) blending of the
central city of the region and its suburbs.' To bolster the
political attractiveness of regionalism, some proponents
attempt to ally the interests of "close-in" or "inner-ring"
t Associate Professor of Real Estate and Legal Studies, Wharton School,
Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Many
thanks to my able research assistant Natalie Heiman. A warm thank you also
to Dr. Michael Woodall, Superintendent of the Norristown Area School District
for his assistance in framing the problems facing his school district.
1. See, e.g., MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR
COmmUNiTY AND STABILITY (1997); Scott A. Bollens, Concentrated Poverty and

Metropolitan Equity Strategies, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y. REV. 11 (1997); Paul
Boudreaux, E Pluribus Unum Urbs:An Exploration of the PotentialBenefits of
Metropolitan Government on Efforts to Assist PoorPersons, 5 VA. J. SOC. POLY
& L. (1998); Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/OneVote and
Local Governments, 60 U. Cm. L. REV. 339 (1993); Anthony Downs, The
Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities, 8 HOUSING POLY DEBATE 359 (1997);

Robert H. Frelich & Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social Costs of Sprawl, 29 URB. LAW
183 (1997); Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CI. L. REv. 253
(1993); Richard Voith, Central City Decline: Regional or Neighborhood
Solutions?, Bus. REV., FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA, Mar./Apr. 1996.

2. See Norman Krumholz, Regionalism Redux, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 83
(1997) (describing how we are presently in the fifth phase of interest in regional
planning by developing cooperative public, private and nonprofit partnerships
to reform government); see also, Voith, supra note 1 (suggesting the need to
reexamine the appropriate roles of suburban, city and regional governments).
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working class suburbs with those of the center city.' These
regionalists admonish residents of inner-ring suburbs to
preview their own future social and economic problems by
looking across the street to the center city. While this may
make for a powerful visual image, it only captures part of
the story. Aligning the interests of these inner-ring
suburban residents with the city fails to account for the
position of the poor living in the suburbs.
At first read, this concept of the suburban poor may
sound at best, trivial, and at worst, oxymoronic. Upon
further investigation, however, the notion of the plight of
the poor in the heart of the suburbs is more complex. The
socio-economic situation of the suburban poor leaves them
with no method to form effective political alliances. The
working class suburbs have joined with the city-in large
part to keep from becoming poor. Zoning insulates the
middle class and the wealthy. Dilution mutes the voice of
the suburban poor as they are scattered throughout the
suburbs in pockets of poverty.
This paper will probe the questions of a regional
approach to the problems of poverty as applied to a
suburban context. Rather than working from the
assumption that the suburbs are an economic and social
monolith defined only by what they are not (the central
city), I will examine how the suburbs need the same
economic and social integration on a sub-regional level that
others are proposing on a regional level. Specifically, this
paper will address new federal housing regulations
promoting deconcentration of poverty. Deconcentration of
suburban
poverty
proves
more
difficult
than
deconcentration of urban poverty because, there is nowhere
left to deconcentrate. This dilemma underscores the
necessity for place-based revitalization efforts in the
suburbs on a more urgent basis than in the city.
As a case study, I will use the housing and educational
problems faced by the city of Norristown in suburban
Philadelphia. I will analyze low income housing
concentration in one of the most wealthy counties in
Pennsylvania. From this discussion will flow proposals for
policy directives that incorporate regional and sub-regional
goals.

3. ORFIELD, supranote 1, at 4.
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II. PLAYERS IN THE REGIONALISM GAME

Regionalization efforts often recognize two participants:
the city and the suburbs. These participants are sometimes
cast as opposing warriors with diametrically opposed goals.
The suburbs are havens for those who have escaped from
the ills of the city, a dying economic beast and a drain on
the region. Suburban residents disassociate from the city,
disconnecting their social lives while denying the impact
their departure has had on their economic lives. The city
tries to tap the suburban pocketbook to pay for social
programs.'
As several studies have proven, however, this
caricature of regional existence is (at least in part) false.
Suburbanites cannot completely disassociate themselves
from the central city because local regional economies are
inextricably linked.6 Suburban employment is closely tied to
the economic well-being of the central city.7 In fact, when
central city income lags too far behind income in the
suburbs, suburban employment is adversely affected.8
When the growth rate of incomes in the central city
increases, there is a positive effect on the growth rate of
suburban incomes.9 Hence, regional planning should be in
everyone's economic best interest.
This evidence of interdependence, though, operates on a
theoretical level that most people fail to appreciate in their
4. See Anthony Downs, Are Suburbs Really Independent from Central
Cities?, 38 NATL. REAL EST. INVESTOR 28, 32 (1996). Professor Frug refers to the
"love/hate" relationship between cities and their suburbs. See Frug, supra note
1, at 279.
5. It is true that in many cases cities have become the centers for
concentrated poverty. For example, in 1990, New York, Chicago, Detroit, Los
Angeles, and Philadelphia combined contained 2.14 million people living in
extreme poverty census tracts (equaling approximately 28% of all such resident
of central cities in 1990). See Downs, supra note 1, at 383. To the extent that
this concentration of poverty exacerbates existing pulls on the economic
resources of the city and pushes central cities further and further into economic
turmoil, the caricature of a distressed central city is correct.
6. H.V. Savitch et al., Ties That Bind. Central Cities, Suburbs, and the New
Metropolitan Region, 7 ECON. DEV. Q. 341 (1993) (citing Richard P. Nathan &
Charles Adams, Understanding Central City Hardship, 91 POL. SCI. Q. 47
(1976) and FourPerspectives on UrbanHardship, 104 POL. SCI. Q. 483 (1989)).
7. Savitch, supranote 6, at 342.
8. Id. (citing Larry C. Ledebur & William R. Barnes, METROPOLITAN
DISPARITIES & ECON. GROWTH, 1992).

9. See Voith, supranote 1, at 5.
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day-to-day lives. The need for suburban-city cooperation
stands in bold relief when the inner ring suburbs are
viewed as the next stop on the route of the creeping doom of
urban blight. To forestall this doomsday scenario, close-in
suburbs have begun to join with the city. For example, in
Cleveland, suburbs are forming a coalition with city officials
called the "First Tier Consortium." °
Inner ring suburbs may have more in common,
economically speaking, with the city than with outer ring
suburbs, simply because of the usual methods of
suburbanization. Historically, as workers from the city
moved into blue-collar suburbs, the middle class took up
residence in the more distant bedroom communities, and
the very wealthy bought vast and great estates removed
from them both." As development moves further and
further from the central city (either linearly or in a leapfrog
fashion), older suburbs begin to confront "city problems":
homelessness, crime, substandard housing, and decaying
commercial strips. 2 In fact, inner suburbs have as much, if
not more, to gain from regionalization as the central city
does." Regionalization spares them from becoming mired in
the economic and social challenges of the city while
demanding that the outer suburbs contribute to their wellbeing. Forming an alliance between the inner suburbs and
the city begins to break the two player regionalization game
into a troika. 14
Myron Orfield, in his book Metropolitics,5 suggests
tranching this process even further. He tells of the reform

10. The 'BurbsFightBack, Bus. WK., June 2, 1997.
11. See Savitch, supranote 6, at 346.
12. ORFIELD, supra note 1, at 15-16; see Downs, supra note 1, at 387; Ruth
E. Knack, The Once and Future Suburb, 52 PLANNING 6, 7 (1986).
13. Myron Orfield suggests that these blue-collar suburbs are the biggest
winners in regional reform. See Myron Orfield, Metropolitics: Coalitions for
Regional Reform, 15 THE BROOKEINGS REv. 6, 9 (1997). He also asserts that
because these inner suburbs lack a central business district and elite
neighborhood tax base, they face prospects even bleaker than those of the core
city. See id. at 7.
14. Another interesting player to add here would be those neighborhoods
within a city that function more like suburbs except for their spatial embedding
within the political boundaries of the core city. They stand, quite possibly, to
gain even more than the inner suburbs because they already are bearing the
brunt of the redistribution of the cost of the urban poor. Regionalization would
lift that burden from them.
15. ORFIELD, supranote 1, at 124-25.
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coalition in Minnesota that pushed an agenda of
regionalization. In his account, the central city, the inner
suburbs, and the low-tax-base developing suburbs 6 band
together to battle the high-tax-base, affluent suburbs. Other
scholars have endorsed this policy because it has the
advantage of transforming the support base from a minority
of the region's citizens-those in the city-to a majority by
bringing in other suburbs.'
This approach does recognize that the suburbs are not a
monolith. It gives tacit approval, however, to the
maintenance of the status quo by quarantining regional
poverty. In fact, an important factor in formulating the
alliance is that if nothing is done regionally, urban
problems will seep into the inner-ring suburbs. The poor
must remain immobile;'8 regionalization merely insures
that everyone in the region pays for it. 9 While the central
city may benefit from the regionalization of the expenses of
concentrated poverty, this approach does not address the
question of the poverty concentration already located in the
suburbs.
III. BEYOND A FouR HANDED GAME
What approach, then, would better speak to the needs
of the suburban poor? One method may begin by
recognizing the social and economic diversity that exists
within the suburbs themselves. I am not talking about the
difference between the working class suburb and the gated
enclave.
One of the "eight myths of poverty' is that most people
in poverty live in inner city ghettos. In 1997 the poverty
rate in the United States was 13.3% (approximately 35.6

16. Their low tax base results from lack of commercial development coupled
with high demand for school expenditures. See id. at 124-25.
17. See Downs, supranote 1, at 399-400.
18. When Myron Orfield discusses the need for regional "fair share" of
affordable housing, he acknowledges that even the inner suburbs do not have
housing for the very poor. See ORFIELD, supranote 1, at 57.
19. I do not disagree with the end of this process. In fact, I have endorsed
just such a scheme. See Georgette Poindexter, Deconstructing the Legal City,
145 U. PA. L. REV. 607, 655 (1997). My point here is that this process cannot be
cloaked in terms of "fairness" and "equality" without explicitly stating that
what is "fair" might still be separate and what is "equal" might still be divided.
20. Knack, supranote 12, at 9.
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million people).2' Of these 35.6 million, the vast majority
(approximately 27.3 million) lived inside metropolitan,
urbanized centers of the US.22 However, 45% of the poor in
the metropolitan areas live outside the central city, in the
suburbs.3
The poor in the suburbs appear less visible because
their presence is more scattered. While central cities had a
poverty rate of 18.8%, the suburbs' poverty rate was less
24 Even though they may be
than half of that-9.0%.
scattered across the suburbs, the suburban poor, when
found, are concentrated into a few municipalities. This
pattern leads to an ironic situation of diluted concentrations
of poverty. Because they are scattered, the suburban poor
lack the political voice to engage in the regionalism
debate.
Suburban redistributive efforts present a more difficult
problem because it is easy to avoid redistribution simply by
changing suburbs. To avoid wealth redistribution of the
poverty-related expenses of the central city, one must move
across the city line. Through political and legal boundaries,
the movers thus insulate themselves from the city's
redistributive efforts. In fact, regionalism is predicated on
this issue. To move from the city to the suburbs requires
effort on the part of the movers. They must break social ties
formed by places of worship and friendships, and often
families are left behind. They may have to break economic
ties by finding a job in the suburbs if the commute into the
city is too long. The costs of these changes may be great.

21. All statistics are taken from Joseph Dalaker and Mary Naifeb, Current
Population Reports, Series P60-201, Poverty in the United States: 1997, U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS 1998.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. In an even more stark comparison, in 1993, 5.3% of the population of
Montgomery County, Pennsylvania lived below the poverty level. In
neighboring Philadelphia County (which is co-terminus with the City of
Philadelphia), 26.5% of the population lived below the poverty level See State
and Metropolitan Area Data Book, 1997-1998 (5th ed.), U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS 149 (1998).
25. See Dalaker & Naifeh, supra note 21.
26. There is also a racial component here. To the extent African-Americans
have suburbanized they have not escaped poverty. See Rodney A. Erickson &
Theodore K. Miller, Race and Resources in Large American Cities: An
Examination of Intraurbanand Interregional Variations, 13 URB.AFFAIRS Q.
401, 414 (1978).
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Once someone is a suburban resident, however,
changing jurisdictions to avoid wealth redistribution is
easier." Because the political subdivisions within the
suburbs are so highly fragmented, it is literally possible to
move down the street and change political jurisdictions.28
Social and economic ties therefore can remain intact. Thus,
the poor in the suburbs suffer the same fate as those in the
city: they lack the political voice to bring attention to their
plight.
Since voluntary wealth redistribution is not likely to
occur, regional cures of place-based efforts or poverty
deconcentration must be implemented. Existing theories of
regionalism must pay special attention to include all
constituencies. For example, instead of a representative
vote on the topics of regionalism, decisions should be made
by direct vote. 9 The game of regionalism must be expanded
beyond even the four players Myron Orfield suggested to
include the unique challenges of suburban poverty. One
example of the intricacies of solving suburban poverty is
Norristown, Pennsylvania.
IV. POVERTY IN THE BELLY OF WEALTH-NORRISTOWN,

PENNSYLVANIA.

Norristown is the county seat of Montgomery County,
Pennsylvania. While Montgomery County is contiguous to
the City of Philadelphia, Norristown lies some 25 miles
west of Philadelphia in the middle of the county.
Montgomery County is one of the wealthiest counties in
Pennsylvania and among the wealthiest in the United
States." Its population in the 1990 census was 678,111. The
median income in 1990 was $43,720. Norristown had a
population of 30,754 in 1990. Its median income was
27. See Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban
Governance, 82 MINN. L. REV. 503, 506 (1997).
28. This is a variation on the argument that the redistribution is best
carried out at the highest level of government because the higher the
governmental entity the more cost associated with moving out of the boundaries
of that entity. See Voith, supranote 1, at 14.
29. This overcomes one of the obstacles to formation of regional
governments cited by Professor Briffault. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 344.
30. See e.g.,<http'//www.montcopa.org/commerce/norris.htm>; <http'J/www.
montcopa.org/commerce/wnorr.htm> ("Update on Montgomery County") (Dec.
15, 1999) (on file with BUFFALO LAW REVIEW) [hereinafter "Community
Profiles"].
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$28,643. On either side of the borough of Norristown lie the
townships of East Norriton and West Norriton. Their
median incomes in 1990 were $47,026 and $43,803,
respectively.31
Poverty within the county is concentrated in the
Norristown area.32 In 1990, the countywide poverty rate was
less than 4%; the poverty rate in Norristown was close to
10%. Using Section 8 housing program certificates as a
proxy for poverty, Montgomery County has a total of 1,677
certificates issued by the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD). As of December, 1998, 721
(43%) of these certificates were used in Norristown. 3 The
remainder is spread throughout the county. 4
Together, the borough of Norristown and the townships
of East Norriton and West Norriton comprise the
Norristown Area School District (NASD). Montgomery
County has a total of 23 school districts. The NASD houses
almost half of the county's Section 8 units (virtually all
within Norristown). The other units are spread amongst the
Countys school districts with the average district having 37
units. As residents of East and West Norriton see their
school district become home to more low income residents,
they flee the district. As they depart, the spiral of poverty
concentration continues.
Norristown bears the brunt of poverty location within
Montgomery County. It is easy to draw the connection
between the incidence of poverty in Norristown and the
concentration of Section 8 housing there. The hard question
31. See id.
32. To a lesser extent, poverty is found in Conshohocken, Bridgeport, and
Pottstown. See id.
33. Fieldwork conducted by the author. Telephone Interview with Audrey
McIntosh, Director of Rental Assistance, Montgomery County Housing
Authority (Dec. 1998).
34. In the Section 8 program, low- and very low-income families are assisted
in obtaining decent and safe housing in the private rental market through
either the voucher or certificate program. Although families may select their
own rental units, such housing must meet Housing Quality Standards and
rents charged must be reasonable in relation to rents charged for comparable
unassisted units in the market area. The units must be at or below the fair
market rent ("FMR") for the area as determined by HUD. See id.
35. See Telephone Interview with Audrey McIntosh, supra note 33.
36. Both townships lost residents between 1990 and 1994 (latest available
data) while the County as a whole increased in population. See Community
Profiles, supranote 30.
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is what to do about it. Policy can take several directions in
addressing this problem. One approach would be to
regionalize the poverty throughout the County by forcing
dispersal of Section 8 housing throughout the County.
The vast majority of the legal cases challenging housing
concentration involve central city public housing projects
rather than suburban Section 8 housing. Also, starting with
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority7 through more
recent cases today, legal attacks on the impropriety of
concentration turn on the issue of race. 8 The issue of
economic concentration has been a by-product of these
discussions, but not the primary focus. Recently
promulgated directives of HUD, however, have taken a new
turn. First, they signal the acknowledgment of the ills of
concentration of poverty through non-project public
housing. Second, the new rules also address income level
without regard to race. These rules have more ready
applicability to the suburbs because they concern scattered
site vouchers rather than traditional public housing
projects.
The existing line of housing project concentration
lawsuits were the building blocks for new HUD directives
governing the Section 8 program. Public Housing
Authorities (PHAs) provide rental assistance through the
Section 8 rental assistance programs funded by HUD."
Enacted on September 10, 1998 and effective October 13,
1998, the new HUD rules established the Section 8
Management Assessment Program (SEMAP). SEMAP is
designed to measure public housing agency performance in
key Section 8 tenant-based areas in poverty concentration."°
The SEMAP program was initially proposed in
December of 1996.41 It articulated fifteen performance
indicators HUD planned to use to evaluate housing agency
performance under Section 8.42 One of these indicators, the
"deconcentration indicator," purported to measure the
efforts of a metropolitan-area housing agency to avoid
concentration of poverty. The deconcentration indicator
37.
38.
39.
(1998).
40.
41.
42.

296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
See e.g., Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
The Section 8 program requirements are codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437
See 24 C.F.R. § 985 (1998); 63 Fed. Reg. 48,548 (1998).
See 24 C.F.R. § 985 (1998); 61 Fed. Reg. 63,930 (1998).
See 61 Fed. Reg. 63,930 (1998).
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would compare the dispersal of Section 8 families
throughout a metropolitan area to the dispersal of fair
market rent (FMR)-priced units43 throughout the same
area. By this comparison, the indicator would measure
whether Section 8 families are at least as dispersed
throughout the area as are FMR-priced units.
The intended purpose of the deconcentration indicator
is to increase housing opportunities available to Section 8
families. Housing agencies "will be encouraged to provide
more outreach to owners in all areas of their respective
jurisdictions and more counseling and transportation
assistance to motivate and increase housing choice on the
part of families."4
HUD dramatically
revised the deconcentration
indicator in the final version of the SEMAP rules. The
Department received approximately 160 responses to its
request for comments on the proposed rule.4 Most of the
comments generally approved the stated purpose of the
SEMAP program, but the comments almost unanimously
objected to the inclusion of the proposed deconcentration
indicator.46 The comments stated that deconcentration of
families receiving rental assistance is outside housing
agency control, since the tenant-based design of the
program permits families to choose their own housing. The
comments also argued that a performance requirement and
the additional costs of administering an effective mobility
program would constitute an unfunded mandate. 7 Some
comments criticized the deconcentration indicator as
complicated and confusing, and suggested that the data
against which performance was to be measured was out of
date. 3
In light of the nearly unanimous objection to the
deconcentration indicator, HIUD elected to revise the
program. The new indicator was named "Expanding
Housing Opportunities." 49 Its stated purpose was to
43. FMR-priced units are standard quality housing units, excluding zeroand one-bedroom units, that rent at or below the fair market rent as
determined using census data and FMRs.
44. 61 Fed. Reg. 63,931 (1998).
45. See 63 Fed. Reg. 48,548 (1998).
46. See 63 Fed. Reg. 48,550 (1998).
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. Id.
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measure a housing agency's efforts to encourage
participation by owners of units located outside areas of
poverty or minority concentration and to inform rental
voucher and certificate holders of the full range of areas
where they may lease housing. The revised indicator
measures housing agency actions that are required by
regulations funded by the administrative fee, which
eliminated concerns regarding an unfunded mandate."
The final version of the rule contains a far more lenient
approach to measuring a housing agency's efforts at
deconcentration, and it does not measure where families
ultimately choose to lease housing. HUD did state, though,
the continued belief that "it is important to develop a
reasonable measure of the extent to which the housing
agency's actions to expand housing opportunities actually
result in family choices to lease housing in low poverty
areas."51 In light of this belief, HUD stated a plan to issue a
new proposed rule containing a potential new SEMAP
deconcentration indicator that would measure outcomes but
would be less complicated than the deconcentration
indicator in the initial proposed rule.
In the meantime, HUD developed a "Deconcentration
Bonus Indicator" to acknowledge the effectiveness of
housing agency actions in achieving deconcentration until a
new SEMAP deconcentration outcome-measuring indicator
is developed and adopted.52 The five-point bonus gives
metropolitan-area housing agencies the option of providing
data on the percent of Section 8 families who choose
housing in low poverty census tracts.53 The bonus points
will be awarded if half or more of all Section 8 families live
in low poverty areas or if the percent of Section 8 mover
families who choose housing in low poverty areas exceeds
by at least two percentage points the percent of all the
housing agency's Section 8 families who live in low poverty

50. See id.
51. Section 8 Rental Voucher and Certificate Programs and Establishment
of Section 8 Management Assessment Program, 63 Fed. Reg. 48,548 (1998).
52. 63 Fed. Reg. 48,551 (1998).
53. Low poverty census tracts are defined as those where the poverty rate in
the tract is at or below ten percent, or at or below the overall poverty rate for
the principal operating area of the housing agency, whichever is greater. The
definition is a relative measure that may differ for the inner city and suburban
portions of a metropolitan area.
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54

The bonus indicator is intended to encourage housing
agency outreach in the same manner as the initial proposed
deconcentration indicator.55 The bonus points are added on
top of a housing agency's final SEMAP score, boosting their
performance assessment. Since the SEMAP scores bear no
direct correlation to funding, the only possible value of
bonus points added to a SEMAP score is a sense of
accomplishment on the part of an individual agency and
commendation from HUD and/or local groups.
The SEMAP regulations suggest a firm commitment on
the part of the federal government to reducing the
concentration of poverty in Section 8 housing. This is a
positive step beyond the limited purview of Gautreaux'srule
forbidding racial concentration in public housing projects.
In practice, however, achieving significant deconcentration
may not be possible without a broad approach that reaches
beyond the efforts of individual housing agencies. These
directives are certainly a step in the right direction, but
they do not alone suffice to ensure that Norristown and
Montgomery County can and will achieve deconcentration.
A number of factors prevent the dispersal of Section 8
housing away from Norristown and throughout
Montgomery County. Although there may be classist and/or
racist discrimination in the de facto closing off of housing in
the rest of Montgomery County, concentration in
Norristown is primarily the result of economic factors.
First, there simply may not be available Section 8
housing in other parts of Montgomery County. Section 8
only permits a certain FMR as the maximum rent for a
Section 8 unit. In many areas of Montgomery County, there
exists little, if any, rental housing for such a low price. In
contrast to the dearth of affordable housing in the rest of
Montgomery County, Norristown has a particularly high
level of low-income rental units. Norristown is a borough
with an industrial history, and as that age passed, many of
the old houses have been subdivided and rented out. Few
rental units have been constructed in Montgomery County
54. For example, if twenty percent of all assisted families are in low poverty
tracts, and twenty-two percent of mover families locate in low poverty tracts,
the housing agency would then be awarded five bonus points in its SEMAP
score.
55. See 63 Fed. Reg. 48,551 (1998).
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over the past ten years, which means that older suburbs,
such as Norristown, contain most of the rental housing.
Other important economic and practical factors in
considering the location of low-income public housing are
transportation and child care. Many Section 8 families do
not own cars and must rely on public transportation to
commute to and from work, as well as to shopping, medical,
and other social services. Montgomery County has a poor
inter-county transportation system that does not allow an
individual to commute easily between points within the
county. Norristown, however, is a transport hub." In
addition, Norristown has easily accessible shopping and all
of the county's social service offices are in Norristown,
because it is the county seat.
Beyond the practical factors, such as the availability of
affordable housing, the corollary question is whether
owners of housing outside of Norristown will be willing to
participate as Section 8 landlords. Section 8 has a bad
reputation in Montgomery County, and Norristown is an
area where many things have been blamed on Section 8. In
the mid-1990's, for example, the county began publicizing
complaints that Section 8 tenants made up the vast
majority of calls to the police emergency line. The
Montgomery
County
Housing
and
Development
Commission then conducted a study to refute these
complaints, and showed that Section 8 tenants accounted
for a far smaller number of calls than had been assumed.57
V. POLITICAL REALITY OF POVERTY DISPERSION

The notion of dispersing poverty amongst wealth is
neither innovative nor novel. Scholars advocated this
method over 30 years ago." The success of the Gautreaux
program in Chicago not only spawned this latest Section 8
56. According to Karen Black, transportation is the most oft-quoted reason
people offer for why they choose to use their Section 8 voucher or certificate in
Norristown. Telephone Interview with Karen Black, Community Builder, HUD
Office, Philadelphia, Pa. (Dec. 1998).
57. See Telephone conversation with Audrey McIntosh, supranote 33.
58. This idea can be found in the Report of the Kerner Commission in 1968.
See Bollens, supra note 1, at 11-12. Also, Anthony Downs, in 1973, proposed to
deliberately deconcentrate poor households by enabling many of them to move
to scattered dwellings in outlying suburban communities. See Downs, supra
note 1, at 390.
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initiative, but also other HUD demonstration projects. 9
What is unique about the SEMAP is that it encourages
housing authorities to deconcentrate within their own
jurisdictions.
Other
programs
have
advocated
deconcentrating central city poverty by moving recipients to
the suburbs. SEMAP recognizes that poverty exists in the
suburban jurisdictions and encourages suburban housing
authorities to address such concentrations.
Wider suburban deconcentration of poverty, however,
exacerbates an already tense political standoff between new
Section 8 arrivals and existing community members. In the
best of circumstances the arrival of Section 8 families
prompts citizen complaints. Whether it can be empirically
proven or not, the perception is that Section 8 tenants ruin
property values and introduce a bad element into the
neighborhood." To some people, Section 8 residents violate
their idea that a life in the suburbs should be the result of
hard work. As one suburban mayor stated, "My
constituents have been able to pull themselves up by the
bootstraps to be here. People resent it when government
tries to make somebody their economic equivalent by
subsidizing them.
In response to this resistance, when central city poverty
is "dispersed" to the suburbs, it reconcentrates in
transitional neighborhoods-turning some suburbs (such as
Norristown)
into
"Section
8"
corridors.6 ' This
reconcentration is the antithesis of the goals of the section 8
program. However, the next deconcentration effort proves
even more difficult than the first. Once poverty is
concentrated in the suburbs, dispersing it among the other
suburban jurisdictions is sure to meet with staunch
opposition. SEMAP presents an attempt to achieve that
suburban deconcentration.
59. For example, the Moving to Opportunity program. See DAVID RUSK,
CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS, 1993 (using Gautreaux as a model for metropoliswide dispersal of poverty); HENRY CISNEROS, INTERWOVEN DESTINIES: CITIES AND
THE NATION (1993) (advocating wide spread implementation of the Moving to
Opportunity program).
60. See James Bovard, Suburban Guerilla, in 27 THE AM. SPECTATOR 26, 30
(1994).
61. Bovard, supra note 60, at 29.
62. For example, 65% of Cook County's Section 8 families are clustered in 14
south suburbs. Bovard, supra note 60, at 28. The same experience occurred in
Washington, D.C., where there is a concentration of Section 8 housing along

Route 1 in Fairfax County, Virginia. See id.
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POVERTY CONCENTRATION
VI. QUESTIONS GOING FORWARD

SEMAP is a very important first step in addressing the
sub-regional issues sometimes overlooked by traditional
regional theorists. It is not, however, the complete answer.
There are limitations to such tactics. If urban to suburban
dispersal proved difficult, one can only imagine the hurdles
imposed by intra-suburban deconcentration. Dispersal,
standing alone, can only go part way-an in-place poverty
relief program must also be implemented. Place-based
strategies generally meet with two criticisms. First, they
keep the poor immobile and "in their place."63 Second, there
is a consensus among social scientists that a strong middleclass presence is necessary for healthy and stable
communities.'
As to the first criticism, regional mobility in our nation
is linked to economic success in large part because of factors
such as exclusionary zoning, which corrals the poor by
denying them access to non-poor areas. Attacks on
exclusionary zoning, however, must be analyzed in light of
the political reality .that community consists of inclusion
and exclusion.65 Although economic exclusion offends a
more egalitarian view of society, it continues to be one of
the driving forces in suburban land use decisions. To
dismiss place-based strategies ignores this reality.
The formidable barriers imposed by exclusionary zoning
require place-based solutions such as community
development grants, human development investment, etc.
The difficulty with the placed-based suburban programs
(just like those in the central city) comes down to paying for
them. If one imagines a metropolitan area as a jigsaw
puzzle, the central city is a fairly large piece. The suburbs
are a collection of small pieces. If the one big piece had
difficulty paying for its poverty, imagine the fate of one tiny
piece trying to do the same. Of course, a quick response to
this would be to prod the poor (and almost poor) little pieces
to join with the big piece to form a formidable alliance

63. john a. powell, Race and Space: What Really Drives Metropolitan
Growth, 16 THE BROOKINGS REv. 20 (1998).
64. See Orfield, supranote 13, at 8.
65. Of course, I am purposely leaving aside issues of racial, religious, and
gender exclusion which have no place in this economically driven decision.
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against the rich little pieces for more regional fimding.G
This assumes, however, the poor small pieces have the
political ability to join in such an alliance. This is the cruel
irony of suburban poverty. Because it lacks the critical
mass of urban poverty, it flies below the radar screen of
suburban politicians. The suburban poor, if politically
mobilized at all, cannot have the political clout of the urban
poor because they lack the capacity seriously to affect the
outcome of political races.
As to the second criticism of place-based strategies: the
importance of a middle class community presence cannot be
overstated. This is why the dispersal strategy is crucial.
Therefore, a solution to the plight of the poor in the suburbs
must join place-based suburban strategies with dispersal
goals. Ironically, if poverty deconcentration truly works,
the suburban poor will be left even more politically muted.
In the meantime, however, the voice of the suburban poor
must be sought and their unique concerns should be
addressed.

66. This, in essence, is Myron Orfield's thesis. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note
1.
67. See, e.g., Bollens supranote 1.

